In 1874, Sir Bartle Frere was sent to South Africa on behalf of the British Empire to investigate the possibility of effecting a federation of that country on a model such as was achieved in Canada. An obstacle to such a scheme was the presence of an independent nation of Zulus in Zululand.
On his own initiative, but without the consent of Her Majesty's Government, he attempted to instigate a war with the Zulus under King Cetshwayo with unreasonable demands that he knew could not be accepted. He issued an ultimatum on December 11, 1878 to Cetshwayo for that purpose.
Cetshwayo, to the surprise of no one, refused.
Lord Chelmsford, the commander-in-chief of British forces originally devised an ambitious 5-prong invasion into Zululand, but modified to a 3-prong affair, taking operational command of the one in the center.
There were around 5,000 men in this column including around 2500 men of the Natal Native Contingent. Colonel Dumford was in command of approximately 1,000 of these natives.
The British regular infantry, and Dumford's men were issued the Martini-Henry breech-loading rifle, which could be fired at a rate of around 7-8 rounds per minute.
The other native contingents were only issued 1 rifle for every 10 men. The rest used the traditional short spears.
The Zulus were armed with short stabbing spears called Ikiwa, and long, narrow hide shields. It has been reported that a few of them had muskets but were not trained sufficiently in how to use them.
Because of the urgency of Lord Bartle's scheme, the attack began in the rainy season which considerably slowed up the advance.
Chelmsford's army reached Rorke's Drift early on January 11th, and crossed the Buffalo River into Zululand.
This forced reached Isandlwana and made camp on January 20th.
Normally when making camp in enemy territory, British military doctrine dictated that some kind of defensive entrenchment be made, and any wagons be circled into a laager. This was not done. Chelmsford stated that he did not feel the need and that it would take too long.
But the real reason was that Chelmsford vastly underestimated the capabilities of the the Zulus. Previous military experience in fighting natives indicated that the main problem was getting them to engage in battle in the first place.
The scouts that were sent out skirmished with a Zulu force of around 2,500 men leading Chelmsford, on their return, to believe that the main Zulu force was right behind them.
So he split his force, personally leading 2,500 men including half the British regulars in pursuit of what he thought was the main body.
Chelmsford left behind 1300 men, only 500 of which were British regulars under the command of the inexperienced Colonel Henry Pulleine. Later that morning, Colonel Anthony Dumford arrived from Rorke's drift with a mounted native contingent to reinforce Pulleine.
The Zulu generals did not fail to notice Chelmsford splitting his forces and took immediate action. They sent a force of 20,000 impis (Zulu warriors) by stealth and amazing speed towards Isandlwana.
By the time Pullein's scouts discovered the presence of the immense Zulu army, they were almost on top of them.
Pulleine deployed his men into lines and prepared to meet them. But he deployed them too far away from camp, and too far from the ammunition wagons.
The ammunition boxes in these wagons presented another problem. The boxes and cartridge cases were still rigged for traveling, and not for battle. It was thought that there would be plenty of time to distribute the extra ammunition. Also, the Quartermasters were reluctant to issue ammunition to any other than to British regulars.
The Zulus attacked in their traditional bull horns and chest tactic. The "chest" would attack drawing the enemy into the "horn" formations.
Each of the British regulars were initially issued 70 rounds of ammunition for their Martini-Henrys. But it was not enough, and being so far back from the camp, fresh ammunition could not reach them fast enough. This was made even more difficult by the manner in which the ammunition was stored and distributed.
Eventually the British flanks were turned, and the slaughter began as more and more troops ran out of ammunition. There were isolated groups fighting desperate "last stands", but once the impis reached the camp, it was over fairly quickly.
Word reached Lord Chelmsford of the attack, and he sent a scout to a high point to observe.
He reported that one moment the tents were there, and the next moment they were gone.
1,329 men were slaughtered.
A smaller force of around 4,000 Zulus crossed the Buffalo River and laid siege to a small British contingent at Rorke's Drift, but were repulsed.
Lord Chelmsford had to withdraw his remaining forces. He was to be replaced by Sir Garnet Wolseley, but Chelmsford defeated the Zulus and captured Cetshwayo before Wolseley arrived.
